贵州省人大


贵阳市非公有制经济组织工会规定
　　（2002年6月20日贵阳市第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第三十九次会议通过　2002年7月30日贵州省第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十九次会议批准 　2002年8月5日公布　2002年9月1日施行)

第一条 为促进非公有制经济发展，维护非公有制经济组织职工的合法权益，根据《中华人民共和国工会法》及有关法律、法规，结合本市实际，制定本规定。
第二条 本市行政区域内的非公有制经济组织职工依法建立工会，开展工会活动；适用本规定。
第三条 非公有制经济组织的工会，是中国工会的基层组织，是非公有制经济组织职工自愿结合建立的群众组织，代表职工的利益，依法维护职工的合法权益。非公有制经济组织职工，有依法参加和组织工会的权利。
上级工会组织领导下级工会组织，上级工会可以派员帮助和指导非公有制经济组织职工组建工会，任何单位和个人不得阻挠。
第四条 非公有制经济组织有工会会员25人以上的，应当建立基层工会委员会；不足25人的，可以单独建立基层工会委员会，也可以由两个以上非公有制经济组织的会员联合建立基层工会委员会，也可以选举1名组织员，组织会员开展活动。女会员10人以上的，可以建立工会女职工委员会，在同级工会领导下开展工作；10人以下的；可以在工会委员会设女职工委员。
非公有制经济组织职工较多的乡（镇）、街道（社区），可以建立基层工会的联合会。
第五条 非公有制经济组织基层工会委员会，具备民法通则规定的法人条件的，经区、县（市）总工会审查，报市总工会批准，依法取得社会团体法人资格，其主席或主持工作的副主席为法定代表人。
第六条 非公有制经济组织的工会主席、副主席、委员及组织员依照《中国工会章程》民主选举产生，选举结果必须报上一级工会批准。
非公有制经济组织工会委员会一般每届任期3年。
第七条 职工200人以上的非公有制经济组织工会，可以设专职工会主席或者副主席。
工会专职主席或者副主席自任职之日起，其劳动合同期限自动延长，延长期限相当于其任职期间；非专职主席、副主席、委员或者组织员自任职之日起，其尚未履行的劳动合同期限短于任期的，劳动合同期限自动延长至任期期满。任职期间个人严重过失的除外。
非公有制经济组织确需变动非专职工会主席、副主席劳动岗位的，应当征得本级工会委员会和上一级工会的同意。
第八条 非公有制经济组织应当按照不低于本单位中层管理人员的标准，支付专职工会主席、副主席的工资；非专职工会主席、副主席、委员或者组织员应当给予适当补贴。
第九条 非公有制经济组织工会的经费来源：
（一）会员交纳的会费；
（二）非公有制经济组织按照每月全部职工工资总额的 2％向工会拨缴的经费，拨缴经费在税前列支；
（三）其他收入。
第十条 非公有制经济组织工会应当建立经费审查委员会或者设立经费审查委员，监督工会经费的使用，确保经费用于工会活动和为职工服务。
第十一条 非公有制经济组织应当支持工会依法开展工作：
（一）提供必要的工作条件；
（二）讨论、决定有关工资、福利、劳动安全卫生、社会保险等涉及职工切身利益的问题，必须听取工会意见；
（三）提前解除职工劳动合同、处分职工，应当事先征求工会意见；
（四）非专职工会主席、副主席、委员或者组织员占用生产或者工作时间从事工会工作，每月不超过3个工作日，其工资和各项待遇不受影响，特殊情况须经非公有制经济组织同意。
第十二条 工会应当支持非公有制经济组织依法行使经营管理权，促进非公有制经济发展：
（一）教育职工保守非公有制经济组织的技术秘密和商业秘密；
（二）教育职工遵守劳动纪律和规章制度，爱护非公有制经济组织的财产；
（三）要求职工履行劳动合同，完成生产和工作任务；
（四）鼓励职工为非公有制经济组织加强管理建言献策；
（五）协助非公有制经济组织开展职业技能培训、技术创新、劳动竞赛等活动，提高劳动生产率和经济效益；
（六）帮助非公有制经济组织搞好劳动安全卫生工作，建立劳动保护监督检查制度，保障职工身体健康和生命安全；
（七）协调非公有制经济组织与职工的劳动关系；
（八）开展工会活动需要占用劳动时间的，应事先征得非公有制经济组织负责人的同意。
第十三条 非公有制经济组织工会应当依法维护职工的合法权益：
（一）代表职工与非公有制经济组织就维护职工合法权益的有关问题，建立平等协商和调解制度；
（二）代表职工与非公有制经济组织就劳动报酬、劳动时间、休息休假、劳动安全卫生、保险福利等内容签订集体合同，指导和帮助职工个人签订劳动合同，监督合同的履行；
（三）听取和反映职工的意见和要求，督促非公有制经济组织改善职工生产、生活条件；
（四）讨论、决定涉及女职工特殊利益的问题时，必须听取工会女职工委员会或者女职工委员的意见；
（五）对非公有制经济组织提前解除职工劳动合同，处分职工不适当的，应当提出意见；
（六）参与对职工因工伤亡事故的调查处理；
（七）督促非公有制经济组织为职工缴纳社会保障费；
（八）会同非公有制经济组织创造条件，组织职工开展健康有益的文化、体育等活动；
（九）制止强迫职工缴纳抵押金、扣留职工的证件、克扣职工工资或者对职工搜身、侮辱、拘禁、殴打等侵犯职工合法权益的行为。
第十四条 违反本规定，依照《中华人民共和国工会法》及有关法律、法规的规定予以处罚。
第十五条 本规定自2002年9月1日起施行。

Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.